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ABSTRACT
Alaska’s long-awaited legal approach to repressed memory syndrome and the
discovery rule was announced in 2014 in the case of Maness v. Gordon. The
Alaska Supreme Court held that discovery rule could not be invoked to toll
the statute of limitations in repressed memory syndrome cases absent
corroborating expert testimony. The court’s brief opinion in Maness provided
little discussion on the scientific controversy surrounding repressed memory
syndrome, created a relatively unique rule, and ultimately did not decide
whether expert testimony would save a repressed memory syndrome claim.
This Note aims to provide a deeper understanding of the controversy
surrounding repressed memory syndrome in the scientific community and to
compare and contrast Alaska’s new rule with the approaches of other states.
Finally, this Note presents some alternative approaches the Alaska
Legislature could consider and raises future issues that Maness did not
address.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a pain – so utter –
It swallows substance up –
Then covers the Abyss with Trance –
So Memory can step
Around – across – upon it –
As One within a Swoon –
Goes safely – where an open eye –
Would drop Him – Bone by Bone1

It is common knowledge that amnesia may result from physical
brain trauma. Take the widely publicized case of Trisha Meili, the
Central Park Jogger, for example. In 1989, Meili was found in the New
York City park brutally raped, beaten, and in a comatose state.2 Meili’s
head injuries were so severe that she lost all memories of her activities
between the four hours prior to her assault and the six weeks after; even
today, she remains unable to recover them.3 The causal relationship
between the incident and Meili’s memory loss is tragic and self-evident.
But what about severe memory loss when physical injury to the
brain has not occurred? The American Psychiatric Association
acknowledges that amnesia may also result from traumatic experience,
unconnected to head injury.4 Memory repression, the theory goes, can
occur as a coping mechanism for individuals that have experienced
traumatic events.5 Uninjured veterans6 and incest victims7 have

1. Robert Howard, “Out of sound – Out of sight”: Emily Dickinson and the
Poetics of Trauma, PSYART (July 21, 2005), http://www.psyartjournal.com/
article/show/howard-out_of_sound_out_of_sight_emily_dickinso. See Gail S.
Goodman et al., Predictors of Accurate and Inaccurate Memories of Traumatic Events
Experienced in Childhood, 3 CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION 269 (1994) (referencing
the poem in relation to psychological trauma).
2. Book Excerpt: ‘I Am the Central Park Jogger’, ABC NEWS
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=1046580 (last visited May 31, 2016).
3. Id.
4. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 298 (5th ed. 2013) (explaining that the diagnostic criteria for
dissociative amnesia is not attributable to neurological or medical conditions
such as head injury).
5. Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie?
Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory
Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129, 133 (1993).
6. Id.
7. See Judith Lewis Herman & Emily Schatzow, Recovery and Verification of
Memories of Childhood Sexual Trauma, 4 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 1, 7–9 (1987)
(discussing the stories of several incest survival support group participants who
repressed some or all of the details about their abuse).
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corroborated the existence of such a condition. Still, it remains hard to
fathom the phenomena and the mechanics it works.
Perhaps the biggest concern surrounding the believability of
repressed memories is that they are, by definition, difficult to study and
prove. Researchers cannot ethically design experiments where the types
of traumatic events most commonly associated with memory repression,
such as child molestation, are inflicted upon participants. Even if
researchers could design such experiments, the fact that memory
repression is unconscious prevents the creation of effective paradigms
through which to obtain objective answers. How can we be sure that
such amnesia really occurs? And, if we can’t be sure, what should we do
when alleged victims claim to have rediscovered these memories
decades after the fact and desire to sue in court?
Until recently, Alaska case law pertaining to rediscovered
repressed memories claims was nonexistent. Alaska was one of the last
states silent towards the issue, despite having one of the top five rates of
physical and sexual abuse of children in the United States8 and a high
percentage of adult female sexual violence victims, approximately
thirty-seven out of every one-hundred.9 It remains unclear whether the
absence of repressed memory case law was due to a lack of repressed
memory syndrome in Alaska or, rather, to victims’ reluctance to bring
recovered memory claims forward.
In 2014 the Alaska Supreme Court finally had the opportunity to
determine the state’s stance on how to deal with repressed memory
syndrome and statute of limitation laws in Maness v. Gordon.10 Bret
Maness, pro se, sued several defendants for a series of sexual assaults he
allegedly suffered as a child in the 1970s.11 Hoping to toll the statute of
limitations of sexual assault, Maness explained that he had repressed all
memories of the abuse until shortly before 2007, when he filed suit.12
The superior court granted summary judgment for the defendants after
Maness failed to respond to a defendant’s expert testimony on repressed
memory syndrome with his own expert to support his story.13 The
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the discovery rule could
8. Facts About Child Sexual Abuse, PROVIDENCE HEALTH & SERVICES, http://
alaska.providence.org/locations/cares/Pages/abusefacts.aspx (last visited May
31, 2016).
9. Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Violence in the State of Alaska: Key
Results from the 2010 Alaska Victimization Survey, UAA JUSTICE CENTER (2010),
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2010/1004.avs_2010/1004.07a.statewide
_summary.pdf.
10. 325 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2014).
11. Id. at 524.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 525.
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not be invoked to toll the statute of limitations absent expert evidence.14
Maness set forth Alaska’s long-awaited legal approach to dealing
with rediscovered memories but the opinion gave only a superficial
discussion of the scientific controversy surrounding repressed memory
syndrome and the court’s reasoning behind the decision. The holding
additionally raises due process concerns for indigent victims that may
have regained access to previously repressed memories of abuse and
desire civil remedies.
This Note discusses Maness v. Gordon in light of the nationwide
controversy surrounding repressed memories and the implications the
holding has for practitioners and future repressed memory plaintiffs.
Part I of this Note explains the theory behind traumatic memory
repression, the research involved, and its criticisms. Differing
approaches taken by courts across the United States to tolling the statute
of limitations for rediscovered memories are then presented and
subsequently compared to the holding in Maness. Part II analyses the
Alaska Supreme Court’s decision. Possible alternatives to the Maness
approach are considered in Part III.

I. REPRESSED MEMORY SYNDROME AND THE LAW
A.

The Psychological Construct

Repressed memory syndrome (“RMS”) was first officially
recognized by the American Psychiatric Association in 1994 through the
association’s inclusion of the disorder in the fourth edition of The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).15 The
DSM was developed in response to the need for uniform classification
system of metal disorders16 and is used as a guidebook for diagnoses by
health care professionals in the United States and abroad.17 Revisions of
the DSM are published periodically with the help of more than 1,000

14. Id. at 526–27.
15. Laura Johnson, Litigating Nightmares: Repressed Memories of Childhood
Sexual Abuse, 51 S.C. L. REV. 939, 943 (2000); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 478 (4th ed. 1994).
16. DSM:
History
of
the
Manual,
AM.
PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N,
http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm/dsm-history-of-the-manual (last
visited May 31, 2015).
17. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Frequently Asked Questions: What is the DSM and
Why is it Important?, DSM-5 DEV., http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/
faq.aspx#1 (last visited May 31, 2016). The American Psychiatric Association
Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics developed the first edition of the
DSM based on the World Health Organization’s sixth edition of International
Classification of Diseases. Id.
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individuals
and
professional
organizations
in
conducting
comprehensive reviews of clinical and empirical literature.18
The fifth and most recent edition of the DSM (DSM-5) was
published in 2013 and continues to include RMS as recognized
diagnosis.19 Alternatively termed “dissociative amnesia,”20 RMS is found
in the DSM-5 within the broader field of dissociative disorders,
disorders “characterized by a disruption of and/or discontinuity in the
normal integration of consciousness [and] memory” in addition to
disruptions in other areas of psychological function such as identity or
behavior.21 Dissociative disorders regularly follow trauma and
dissociative symptoms such as amnesia, numbing, and detachment from
one’s self or surroundings are frequently experienced by those suffering
from posttraumatic stress disorder and other stress-related mental
illnesses.22
Specifically, RMS is characterized by “an inability to recall
autobiographical information, usually of a traumatic or stressful nature,
that is inconsistent with normal forgetting.”23 The forgotten information
may concern a mere aspect of an event, include an entire time period, or
cover one’s own identity and life events.24 Furthermore, those suffering
from RMS may or may not be aware that a memory gap even exists.25 In
most cases, individuals are unaware of the memory loss unless it
involves an aspect of their identity or normal life history.26 Dissociative
amnesia, of course, does not cover disturbances in memory attributable
to “physiological effects of a substance . . . or a neurological or other
medical condition.”27 Unlike permanent amnesias due to some sort of
physical or chemical altercation to the brain that prevents memory
storage or retrieval, one unique aspect of dissociative amnesia is its
reversibility: although the memory is presently inaccessible, it was at
one point successfully stored and may therefore be regained.28
The prevalence of RMS on a national scale would be hard to
calculate accurately, though the DSM discusses a 12-month RMS
prevalence study among adults in a small U.S. community.29 The study
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 4.
Id.
Id. at 291.
Id.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 291.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 298.
Id.
Id. at 299.
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reported a RMS prevalence of 1.8% in the community, specifically 1.0%
among males and 2.6% for females.30 Instances of RMS have been
observed in individuals of all ages, however, from children to teenagers
to adults.31
Theories about the psychological motivation for RMS suggest that
repression occurs in some individuals as an involuntary ego-defense
mechanism to keep traumatic, painful, or socially unacceptable
memories from conscious awareness—in doing so, these individuals can
continue to function normally in everyday life.32 Repression of similarly
unacceptable feelings or impulses may occur for this same reason and
they, like repressed memories, remain present in one’s brain but are
pushed into unconscious thought.33 Though the individual is granted
immediate relief, the repressed stress may reveal itself in other ways,34
however, such as through manifestations of depression, sexual
dysfunction, self-harm, and an impaired ability to maintain
relationships.35 Eventual recovery of these repressed memories may
occur at a more convenient stage in one’s life where the trauma can be
dealt with, and recovery is claimed to have been triggered both with and
without therapy.36
However, determining with certainty how conscious—let alone
unconscious—memory functions is incredibly difficult. Due to the
unethical nature of the events associated with the onset of repression,
researchers are precluded morally and by Institutional Review Boards
from significantly testing and experimenting with RMS and its
underlying theory.37 Thus, any support for the existence of repressed
memory syndrome must be clinical or statistical.
In a unique attempt to gain insight into how children remember
traumatic experiences, researchers located forty-three children ranging
from three to ten years old scheduled to undergo a painful medical
procedure involving urethral catheterization.38 These subjects were
interviewed at various stages following the procedure to determine the

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5; Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories
and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1185, 1204 (1992).
33. Kanovitz, supra note 33.
34. Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5, at 137.
35. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 4, at 299.
36. Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5, at 137–38.
37. See Institutional Review Board Guidebook: Introduction, OFF. FOR HUM. RES.
PROTECTIONS, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_introduction.htm
(last visited May 31, 2016) (“[B]rutal or inhumane treatment of human subjects is
never morally justified.”).
38. Gail S. Goodman et al., supra note 1, at 275.
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extent and accuracy of their recollection of the procedure’s events.39
Results supported the conclusion that age was correlated with
significantly greater accuracy and resistance to misinformation.40 Thus,
memory repression seems more likely to occur at younger ages, which
makes sense in light of the frequency of repressed child abuse memory
claims. Controlling for age, repetition of the procedure did not
significantly affect memory, though other factors, such as the emotional
support provided by the children’s parents, was correlated with better
recollection.41 This suggests that memory repression may be mitigated
through social support immediately surround the traumatic event.
A more typical example of repressed memory research comes from
a 1987 study by Herman and Schatzow, who interviewed fifty-three
women in an incest survivor therapy group about their experiences.42
This research was especially important because most of these women
had corroborating evidence of their abuse, which is rare. Sixty-four
percent of these women reported at least some degree of amnesia related
to the abuse, and twenty-eight percent described severe deficits.43 Abuse
involving violence or occurring prior to adolescence was positively
correlated with memory loss.44
Further support for the existence of repressed memories comes
from widespread survey data. One survey directed by Diana Elliot
gathered national data from 225 men and 280 women, aged eighteen to
seventy-five.45 A majority of survey participants who had been involved
in a traumatic event, including “childhood sexual abuse, military
combat, or witnessing the murder or suicide of a loved one,” did not
suffer from subsequent memory loss; however, approximately twenty
percent of respondents experienced a period of temporary amnesia
surrounding the entire event.46 Remembrance of these episodes was
generally triggered by an event, such as reading something about the
incident in the media.47 Approximately thirty-three percent of
respondents who had been victims of childhood sexual abuse recovered
memories during intercourse later in their adult lives.48 In contrast to the
39. Id. at 276.
40. Id. at 278.
41. Id.
42. Herman & Schatzow, supra note 7, at 10.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Bruce Bower, Trauma Survey Delves into Delayed Recall, SCI. NEWS (Aug.
26, 1995), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Trauma+survey+delves+into
+delayed+recall.-a017288645.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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DSM survey discussed earlier, the results of this survey suggest that
RMS may actually affect a substantial number of individuals in some
form.
Still, given the inability to scientifically reproduce RMS in the
controlled laboratory setting, many are not convinced of its existence.
Adding fuel to the fire are studies exposing the general vulnerability of
memories and, in some cases, even the implantation of false memories,
which raise questions about the validity of recovered memories.49
People’s stored memories can be altered to include false
information.50 Research concerning this “misinformation effect” was
first published in 2005 and involved presenting subjects with a video of
an event, such as the theft of a girl’s wallet.51 Some subjects were then
subsequently misinformed about certain aspects of the event, including
the girl receiving an arm injury, when it was apparent from the footage
that only her neck had been hurt.52 When interviewed later,
approximately forty-seven percent of participants claimed to have
remembered the later-provided misinformation as having actually been
part of the event.53 If memory repression does occur, repressed
memories could be just as vulnerable to the issues of malleability as
normal memories, perhaps even more so because of how much time has
passed. One counter to this critique, however, is that unconscious
memories are unlike conscious memories insomuch that they do not
have the same opportunity for modification through rehearsal, as
exemplified in experiments like these. Perhaps unconscious memories
are actually less subject to misinformation because we are unable to
consciously revise them according to conflicting outside information.
Researchers have also delved into the possibility of implanting false
memories of entire events in an individual’s mind.54 Loftus and Coan

49. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, When a Lie Becomes Memory’s Truth: Memory
Distortion After Exposure to Misinformation, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL.
SCI. 121 (1992) (discussing many studies demonstrating the malleability of
memory).
50. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A 30year Investigation of the Malleability of Memory, 12 LEARNING MEMORY 361 (2005)
(discussing several research studies on the effects of misinformation on memory,
including one where subjects who watched a video of an event, and then were
given incorrect information about the event, incorporated the incorrect
information into their actual memory of watching the event).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 518, 530 (1993) (“There are numerous anecdotes and experimental
studies that show it is indeed possible to lead people to construct entire
events.”).
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created several paradigms in which false memories were implanted in
child subjects by trusted family members.55 One of the most memorable
was described in a 1993 report: a fourteen-year-old boy named Chris
was convinced by his older brother Jim that he had been lost in a
shopping mall at the age of five when in truth such an event had not
happened.56 Jim’s story about Chris was told to Chris as follows:
It was 1981 or 1982. I remember that Chris was 5. We had gone
shopping at the University City shopping mall in Spokane.
After some panic, we found Chris being led down the mall by a
tall, oldish man (I think he was wearing a flannel shirt). Chris
was crying and holding the man’s hand. The man explained
that he had found Chris walking around crying his eyes out
just a few moments before and was trying to help him find his
parents.57
In the days following this story, Chris began to “remember” how
he had felt while lost at the mall, and made statements such as “[t]hat
day I was so scared that I would never see my family again. I knew that
I was in trouble” and “I remember mom telling me never to do that
again.”58
A period of weeks later, Chris was capable of providing great detail
about the made-up event.59 He stated to his family:
I was with you guys for a second and I think I went over to
look at the toy store, the Kay-bee toy, and uh, we got lost and I
was looking around and I thought, “Uh-oh. I’m in trouble
now.” You know. And then I . . . I thought I was never going to
see my family again. I was really scared you know. And then
this old man, I think he was wearing a blue flannel, came up to
me . . . he was kind of old. He was kind of bald on top . . . he
had like a ring of gray hair . . . and he had glasses.60
The ability of the mind to create vivid but false memories out of lies
illustrates the fragile nature of memory and it’s potential for
manipulation, especially, as illustrated by Loftus and Coan, in children.
Similarly, techniques by police have induced false memories of
defendants in interrogations.61 In the infamous case of Paul Ingram,
55. Id. at 532.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 533 (discussing how five months of police interrogation caused
Paul Ingram to create and confess to memories of fantastical allegations);
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Ingram was accused of and arrested for the molestation of his two
daughters following their return from a church camp that supported the
discovery and recollection of such memories.62 Long employed in the
Olympia, Washington Sheriff’s Office as chief civil deputy, Ingram
denied the abuse but was convinced after five months of interrogation
by detectives and a psychologist that he had committed “rapes, assaults,
child sexual abuse, and [participated] in a Satan-worshipping cult
alleged to have murdered 25 babies”63 and even began to describe
increasingly fantastical memories of such events.64 Ingram couldn’t
believe that his daughters could be wrong about experiencing such
conduct, and believed satanic possession was possible as part of his
religious beliefs.65 Richard Ofshe, a psychologist, was hired by the
prosecution for trial.66 Ofshe tested Ingram by attempting to convince
Ingram that he had committed an additional, fabricated act of
molestation on his children.67 As a result, Ingram developed memories
of the event to such a detailed extent that he could write a confession
several pages long.68 Despite being presented this discovery, Ingram
was so convinced of his newfound memories that he pled guilty to his
charges and was sentenced to twenty years in prison.69
It is clear from Paul Ingram’s case that false memories can have
devastating consequences, and that those who believe them are capable
of describing those false memories in great detail and certainty. This
certainty likely also influences those who hear them. As the recollections
of repressed memories are often assisted through therapy, there is
similarly great concern that therapists may implant false memories in
their patients.70 Several cases surrounding the issue of therapy-derived
implanted memories popped up around the US during the 1980s and
90s, a period that has been compared to the Salem witch trials.71
Patients have come forward to discuss the suggestive nature of
Richard A. Leo, The Social and Legal Construction of Repressed Memory, 22 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 653, 656 (1997) (discussing how once police interrogation ended,
Paul Ingram realized his memories were coerced).
62. Leo, supra note 61, at 655.
63. Loftus, supra note 54, at 533.
64. Leo, supra note 61, at 655.
65. Id.
66. Loftus, supra note 54, at 533.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Leo, supra note 61, at 656.
70. See Loftus, supra note 54, at 533 (discussing the great need for research
and reexamination of psychotherapy practices).
71. Jorge L. Carro & Joseph V. Hatala, Recovered Memories, Extended Statutes
of Limitations and Discovery Exceptions in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: Have We
Gone Too Far?, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1239, 1245 (1996).
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their therapy sessions.72 Elizabeth F. Loftus discusses the informative
experience of Greg Zimmerman, among others, in an article on
repressed memories.73 An interview with Zimmerman on ABC News in
1992 led to the discussion of his experience seeing a psychotherapist in
an attempt to cope with the suicide of his father.74 He expressed that “I
would try to talk to her about the things that were very painful in my
life and she kept saying that there was something else.”75 Eventually she
told Zimmerman that he exhibited the characteristics of a victim of
satanic ritual abuse.76 Zimmerman, an attorney, was fairly certain he had
not experienced any satanic abuse in his life, and could not understand
how the therapist could have come to such a conclusion.77 Around this
time, the False Memory Syndrome Foundation was established as a
source of support and public awareness by parents across the country
falsely accused of incest.78 Several books criticizing the unprecedented
increase in child sex abuse cases and the popularization of repressed
memory syndrome as a disorder were also published.79
This history of suggestive therapy and implanted memories casts a
shadow of doubt over the accuracy of recovered repressed memories,
particularly for those recovered by therapists. It also brings into
question whether any state law requiring therapist expert testimony is
actually meaningful in determining whether or not to allow such a
lawsuit to proceed.
B.

The Legal Response

As the issues of RMS broke into the legal arena in the 1980s and
90s, courts had to determine the admissibility of expert witness
testimony on RMS and, in cases where the statute of limitations had run
out, whether to allow such testimony for the purposes of the discovery

72. See Loftus, supra note 54, at 528 (describing client descriptions of the
suggestive techniques used in their therapy sessions).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Early History of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, FALSE MEMORY
SYNDROME FOUND., http://www.fmsfonline.org/?about=EarlyHistory (last
updated Dec. 13, 2013).
79. See, e.g., MARK PENDERGRAST, VICTIMS OF MEMORY: SEX ABUSE
ACCUSATIONS AND SHATTERED LIVES (2d ed. 1996); RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN
WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS: FALSE MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SEXUAL
HYSTERIA (1996); ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF
REPRESSED MEMORY: FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (reprt.
rev. 1996).
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rule.
Statutes of limitations are the result of the legislative belief that
eventually “the right to be free of stale claims . . . prevail[s] over the
right to prosecute them.”80 The idea that claims have an expiration
period protects both defendants and the courts from cases “in which the
search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence.”81
Witnesses die, physical evidence is lost, and, as discussed above,
memories fade, resulting in difficulty for both mounting a defense and
determining a case. Thus, statutes of limitations allow for better
accuracy in settling claims, and encourage plaintiffs to either bring suit
or forever hold their peace.
Nonetheless, courts have recognized that, in some cases, statutes of
limitations may need to be tolled in the interest of fairness. In these
cases, states have adopted what is commonly known as the “discovery
rule,” which generally delays statutes of limitations from accruing until
the harm committed by the defendant is actually discovered.82 The
discovery rule was traditionally applied in medical malpractice cases.
For example, the rule was applied in cases where surgical instruments
were left in patients during surgery and the patient became aware of
that fact only after the statute of limitations had passed.83
Application of the discovery doctrine has been sought by plaintiffs
in recovered repressed memory cases. The first case attempting to toll
the discovery rule was unsuccessful. In Tyson v. Tyson,84 the Washington
state Supreme Court refused to apply a delayed discovery rule to toll the
statute of limitations for the plaintiff, who claimed she had repressed all
memory of her father sexually assaulting her over a nine-year period
until she had entered therapy fifteen years later.85 The court explained
that the discovery rule may only apply in cases where “the objective
nature of the evidence makes it substantially certain that the facts can be

80. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting R.R.
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
81. Id.
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 70
(2011) (“Because lack of notice and disability on the part of the claimant—
particularly when combined with dissembling or concealment on the part of the
defendant—are among the principal grounds on which a delay in bringing suit
may be excused, restitution claimants in such circumstances will often be
granted the protection of a discovery rule.”).
83. See, e.g., Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631 (Wash. 1969) (holding that the
discovery rule shall be applied when medical malpractice occurs as a result of
negligently leaving foreign articles in surgery patients).
84. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986) (en banc), superseded by statute, WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1988).
85. Id. at 229–30.
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fairly determined even though considerable time has passed since the
alleged events occurred.”86 To allow application of the discovery rule to
recovered repressed memory actions would defeat the purpose of
statute of limitations, given that the balance of interests weighed in
favor of defendants given the low likelihood of ascertaining the truth.87
The Washington legislature made the ruling obsolete, however, by
enacting Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.340. The statute provides that actions
based on childhood sexual abuse claims may be brought “[w]ithin three
years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have
discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act.”88 This
act was the first to apply the discovery doctrine to civil cases of
childhood sexual abuse.89
Since Tyson v. Tyson,90 legal approaches to dealing with RMS
amongst the several states have varied. Some states have passed statutes
providing extended periods of time for which child sex abuse claims
may be brought.91 In states without such provisions—or even in states
like Alaska, which passed such a provision, but non-retroactively—
tolled claims must be fit into broader tolling statutes or into common
law discovery rule. State courts have split between whether to allow
application of the discovery rule to tolled recovered repressed claims.
Some states refuse to apply the discovery rule to any types of cases
under any circumstances. Idaho, for example, has declared that it “is not
a discovery jurisdiction.”92 States that do apply the discovery rule have
provided a variety of reasons for refusing to do so in RMS cases. The
Maryland Court of Appeals, for example, held that RMS does not
activate the discovery rule because it is “unconvinced that repression
exists as a phenomenon separate and apart from the normal process of
forgetting.”93 The Supreme Court of Michigan declined to apply the
discovery rule or a statutory insanity grace period because doing so
“would endanger precisely those policy goals advanced by statutes of

86. Id. at 229.
87. Id. at 230.
88. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1988).
89. See Julie M. Kosmond Murray, Repression, Memory, and Suggestibility: A
Call for Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Sexual
Abuse Trials, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 477, 487 (“Since [WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.16.340], at least twenty-eight other states have adopted similar legislation.”).
90. 727 P.2d 226.
91. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130
(1993); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-103.7
(1994).
92. Bonner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 913 P.2d 567, 568 (Idaho
1996).
93. Doe v. Maskell, 679 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Md. 1996).
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limitations.”94 Unlike the majority of jurisdictions who allow the
discovery rule in RMS claims, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
follows an objective approach to limitation periods and thus applies the
discovery rule in only the most limited of circumstances “by focusing on
the nature of the injury rather than the particularities of the specific
plaintiff.”95 In S.V. v. R.V.,96 the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply
the discovery rule based on “expert testimony on subjects about which
there is no settled scientific view” because of the inability to provide
objective verification of the claim.97 Minnesota has taken a similar view:
that expert testimony on the theory of repressed and recovered memory
may lack foundational reliability and therefore may not be used to show
timeliness.98
A substantial number of states allow RMS claims to extend the
statute of limitations, though expert testimony may be required at trial.99
In Doe v. Roe,100 the Arizona Supreme Court explained that allowing
application of the discovery rule to RMS cases was consistent with the
underlying policy of the discovery rule, and “logically appropriate given
that the intentional act of the tortfeasor caused both the damage and the
repression of memory.”101 To hold otherwise would reward perpetrators
and contradict the Arizona legislature’s policy of imposing severe
criminal penalties for the sex abuse of children.102 In its first RMS case,
New Hampshire simply explained that it found “no reason why it
should not apply.”103
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmatively held the
discovery rule applicable to RMS cases, reasoning that “equating a

94. Lemmerman v. Fealk, 534 N.W.2d 695, 702 (Mich. 1995).
95. Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 170–71 (Pa. 1997).
96. 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996).
97. Id. at 18.
98. Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 171 (Minn. 2012).
99. These states include the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah.
See, e.g., Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1994); Dunlea v. Dappen, 924 P.2d
196 (Haw. 1996), abrogated by Hac v. Univ. of Hawai’i, 73 P.3d 46 (Haw. 2003);
Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362 (Iowa 1994); Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331
(Me. 1996); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1995) (en banc), reh’g denied
(July 25, 1995); Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990); McCollum v. D’Arcy,
638 A.2d 797 (N.H. 1994); Peterson v. Huso, 552 N.W.2d 83 (N.D. 1996); Ault v.
Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994), superseded by statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.11 (West 2006), as recognized in Pratte v. Stewart, 929 N.E.2d 415 (Ohio
2010); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624 (Okla. 1992); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d
1345 (Utah 1993).
100. 955 P.2d 951 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc).
101. Id. at 960.
102. Id.
103. McCollum, 638 A.2d at 799.
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repressed memory to merely ‘forgetting’ ignores advances in the
understanding of the human mind.”104 Although RMS does not concern
a precise science, the court determined that “the same can be said about
many cases involving a ‘battle of experts.’”105 In court, expert testimony
must prove both the abuse and that the memories of the abuse were
repressed106; however, application of the discovery rule and the
existence of corroborating evidence are questions of fact for the jury to
determine.107
Including Alaska, some states require something extra at the
pleading stage for discovery rule to apply in RMS cases. Oklahoma
requires by statute objective, verifiable evidence that the victim
psychologically repressed the memory of the facts upon which that
claim was predicated and that the alleged sexual abuse occurred.108 New
Mexico requires “competent medical or psychological testimony” for
discovery rule to apply.109 Application of these two statutes has yet to be
tested in court.
Taking a slightly different approach, California requires
“certificates of merit” to be filed in order for discovery rule to apply in
child abuse cases where the plaintiff is of 26 years of age or older.110
These certificates of merit require that the attorney review the facts of
the case with at least one licensed mental health practitioner who is not a
party to the litigation and has concluded that there is reasonable and
meritorious cause to file the action.111
The Alaska Supreme Court held in Maness that expert testimony is
required for the discovery rule to apply in RMS cases; however, in
contrast to states like South Carolina, Alaska did not treat discovery rule
as a question of fact for the jury. The requirement instead serves a
barrier between RMS plaintiffs and a jury if the abuse they suffered
occurred prior to the enactment of Alaska’s current limitation-extending
statutes and they cannot afford expert testimony at the pleading stage.
While such a rule is not without support, it is perhaps more unique than
Maness suggests.

104.
2000).
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 534 S.E.2d 672, 677 (S.C.
Id.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 681.
OKLA. STAT. 12, § 95(6) (2006).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30A(2) (1996).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(g) (West 2004).
§ 340.1(h).
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II. MANESS V. GORDON: REQUIRING REPRESSED MEMORY EXPERT
TESTIMONY FOR DISCOVERY RULE IN ALASKA
A.

The Facts

The facts discussed in the opinion surrounding Maness v. Gordon112
are brief, and there is limited information to be found on the online
docket besides motions to waive fees, bonds, or filing extensions.113 The
Alaska State Law Library has on file three other documents from the
appeal from the Superior Court: Maness’s opening brief, the brief of the
Gordon appellees, and the brief of appellee James Serfling. Factual
information from these briefs is included here to supplement the
Supreme Court’s opinion.
In the Anchorage superior court on October 30, 2007, Bret Maness,
representing himself pro se, sued Mike Gordon, Shelley Gordon, James
Serfling, and nine other defendants for assault and battery, sexual
assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false
imprisonment, based on a series of alleged sexual assaults inflicted on
him as a child in the 1970s.114 According to Maness, the acts took place in
a backroom of the Mike and Shelly Gordon’s Novelty shop, near Fourth
Avenue and D Street in downtown Anchorage when he was eleven
years old.115 Maness claims he was given date rape drugs, put under
hypnosis, and sexually assault on several occasions.116 The hypnosis was
allegedly so strong that Maness had no recollection of the incident
between assaults and instead recalled only making purchases at the
store.117 Maness said he returned to the shop several times and
occasionally brought friends, who were likewise hypnotized and
assaulted.118 Eventually, Maness had a break in his hypnosis and made a
report to the police.119 Maness then realized “nothing would be done to
the Gordons by APD [and] [s]o he decided he must do something
himself.”120 Maness allegedly vandalized the store by throwing rocks at

112. 325 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2014).
112. See e.g., Alaska Appellate Courts Case Management System, ALASKA STATE
APPELLATE COURTS, http://www.appellate.courts.state.ak.us/main.asp (entering
into the search engine the Maness v. Gordon Appellate Case Number S14753).
114. Maness, 325 P.3d at 524.
115. Appellant’s Opening Brief, at 2, Maness v. Gordon, 325 P.3d 522 (Alaska
2014) (No. S-14753) [hereinafter Maness Brief].
116. Maness Brief, supra note 115, at 3–6.
117. Id. at 4.
118. Id. at 4–5.
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id.
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Maness claimed his mother also reported to the police that
suspicious activity was occurring at the novelty shop.122 Maness was
subsequently called to meet with the vice-principal at his elementary
school.123 In that meeting, Maness claims to have been hypnotized by
vice-principal Serfling, who instructed him to “forget all about that
novelty shop.”124 Maness claims the hypnosis worked and that he
completely forgot about all of these events until shortly before the case
was filed.125
Denying all of the allegations against them, defendants moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations
had run.126 Maness argued that his recent recovery of his repressed
memories should cause the discovery rule to apply, therefore tolling his
time to bring a claim until his memories had been recovered.127
Defendants retained a developmental and experimental psychologist,
Dr. Brainerd, who proclaimed Maness’s claims as inconsistent with
repressed memory syndrome in an affidavit to the court.128 The court
then ordered Maness to respond in kind with the affidavit of a qualified
expert to support his claim.129 When Maness failed to do so, the superior
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.130
Maness appealed, arguing (1) that his claims were timely under
sections 09.10.065(a) and 09.10.140(b) of the Alaska Statutes; (2) that the
discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until he recovered the
repressed memories and thus his claims are timely; and (3) requiring an
indigent plaintiff to provide expert testimony violates the due process
clauses of the Alaska and United States Constitutions.131
B.

AS 09.10.065 and AS 09.10.140

Sections 09.10.065(a)132 and 09.10.140(b)133 of the Alaska Statutes
provide for the tolling or elimination of statute of limitations for certain

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Maness v. Gordon, 325 P.3d 522, 524 (Alaska 2014).
Id.
Id. at 524–25.
Id. at 525.
Id.
Id. at 525–27.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.065(a) (2013).
Id. § 09.10.140(b).
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sexual abuse claims. Section 09.10.065(a) provides as follows:
A person may bring an action at any time for conduct that
would have, at the time the conduct occurred, violated
provisions of any of the following offenses: (1) felony sexual
abuse of a minor; (2) felony sexual assault; (3) unlawful
exploitation of a minor; (4) felony sex trafficking; or (5) felony
human trafficking.134
Section 09.10.140 provides:
(a) . . . [I]f a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this
chapter is at the time the cause of action accrues either (1)
under the age of majority, or (2) incompetent by reason of
mental illness or mental disability, the time of a disability
identified in (1) or (2) of this subsection is not a part of the time
limit for the commencement of the action. Except as provided
in (b) of this section, the period within which the action may be
brought is not extended in any case longer than two years after
the disability ceases.
(b) An action based on a claim of sexual abuse under AS
09.55.650 [providing for claims based on sexual abuse to a
minor under sixteen years of age] that is subject to AS
09.10.065(b) [which sets the statute of limitations for
misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor and misdemeanor sexual
assault at three years] may be brought more than three years
after the plaintiff reaches the age of majority if it is brought
under the following circumstances:
(1) if the claim asserts that the defendant committed one
act of sexual abuse on the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall
commence the action within three years after the plaintiff
discovered or through use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered that the act caused the injury or condition;
(2) if the claim asserts that the defendant committed more
than one act of sexual abuse on the plaintiff, the plaintiff
134. Id. § 09.10.065. It should additionally be noted that section
11.81.900(a)(24) of the Alaska Statutes provides that “felony” means a crime for
which a sentence of imprisonment for a term of more than one year is
authorized. Alaska law considers sexual abuse of a minor in the first, second,
and third degrees to be felonies, and sexual abuse of a minor in the fourth
degree to be a misdemeanor. Id. §§ 11.41.434, 11.41.436, 11.41.438, 11.41.440. As
the court found these statutes not retroactively applicable, there is no discussion
on whether or not, if the statutes were applicable, section 09.10.065(a) would
apply. The ages of defendants in comparison to the plaintiff at the time of the
alleged assaults are not discussed.
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shall commence the action within three years after the
plaintiff discovered or through use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the effect of the injury or condition
attributable to the series of acts; a claim based on an
assertion of more than one act of sexual abuse is not
limited to plaintiff’s first discovery of the relationship
between any one of those acts and the injury or condition,
but may be based on plaintiff’s discovery of the effect of
the series of acts.135
The Alaska Supreme Court found these two statutes to be
inapplicable to Maness’s case, as “both of these statutes were enacted
long after the events [Maness] describes in his complaint,136 and neither
applies retroactively.”137 In arriving at this conclusion, the court cited
Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska v. Does,138 a 2006 case where the Alaska
Supreme Court considered whether section 09.10.065 applied
retroactively to civil claims of abuse despite the legislature’s clear
intention to prevent retroactive effect of the statute on covered criminal
claims.139 Under section 01.10.090, which states that “[no] statute is
retrospective unless expressly declared therein,” a presumption in
Alaska exists against retrospective legislation.140 In light of section
01.10.090, Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska held that without the
legislature’s express provision for retroactive effect to civil claims under
section 09.10.065, such protection did not apply in light of clear
legislative expression that there was no retroactive application to
criminal claims.141 Although section 09.10.140 had not previously been
held as non-retroactive, the Maness court determined that neither the
statute itself nor the session laws surrounding it contained any language
providing express legislative intent to do so.142
C.

Discovery Rule

Without the protection of either statute, Maness’s claim could only
be considered timely if the discovery rule was applicable.143 The opinion
135. Id. § 09.10.140(b).
136. Section 09.10.065(a) was enacted in 2001, section 09.10.140(b) was
enacted in 1990, and the latest event described by Maness apparently occurred in
1985. Maness, 325 P.3d at 525 n.9.
137. Id. at 525.
138. 141 P.3d 719 (Alaska 2006).
139. Id. at 720.
140. ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.090 (1962).
141. Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska, 141 P.3d at 724–25.
142. Maness, 325 P.3d at 525 n.10.
143. Id. at 525.
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explains the discovery rule as “where an element of a claim is not
immediately apparent, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until a reasonable person would have enough information to alert him
that he ‘has a potential cause of action or should begin an inquiry to
protect . . . her rights.’”144 To bolster his argument, Maness cited Phillips
v. Gelpke,145 a New Jersey case, for the proposition that expert testimony
was unnecessary to invoke the discovery rule in his case.146
In Gelpke, 19-year-old Phillips sued her uncle Gelpke for childhood
sexual abuse, the memory of which she had for some time repressed.147
Though Phillips provided expert testimony at trial on her psychological
suffering, the expert did not diagnose Phillips with repressed memory
syndrome.148 The jury returned a verdict for Phillips and Gelpke
appealed, arguing that such a diagnosis was necessary.149 The New
Jersey Supreme Court determined that because Philips had recovered
her memories without expert help, an expert’s explanation of how she
could recover such memories was not necessary.150
The Alaska Supreme Court found that Gelpke did not support
Maness’s claims because under the facts of that case, the statute of
limitations for Philip’s claim had not yet expired.151 The court then held
that invocation of the discovery rule to allegations of repressed
memories could not occur without the production of expert testimony.152
Such a decision, the court claimed, was “consistent with the decisions of
most courts considering repressed memory syndrome claims” as well as
Alaska case law requiring expert testimony to prove medical or legal
malpractice unless the negligence alleged is sufficiently non-technical to
be cognizable by laypersons.153 The court affirmed the superior court’s
grant of summary judgment on Maness’s claims, concluding that his
claims were time-barred in light of his lack of expert testimony.154
The reasoning behind the court’s holding in Maness, albeit brief,
addresses valid concerns in dealing with RMS cases. Maness’s alleged
facts are also fantastical, which may make limit sympathy for this case.
Nonetheless, the court did not address in their opinion at least three
areas of importance for potential future RMS plaintiffs.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 526 (citations omitted).
921 A.2d 1067 (N.J. 2007).
Maness, 325 P.3d at 526.
Gelpke, 921 A.2d at 582–83.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Maness, 325 P.3d at 526.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 526–27.
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First, the court did not acknowledge the relative uniqueness of its
rule or acknowledge the controversy in the scientific community
surrounding repressed memory syndrome. As discussed above, several
states have allowed RMS claims to extend the statute of limitations
without the use of expert testimony at the summary judgment stage,
though they require expert testimony at trial. The court cites cases like
this,155 in addition cases where expert testimony on RMS is not
admissible at all under evidentiary standards,156 without making a
distinction between those holdings and what is being held in Maness.
RMS and the varying attempts by states to deal with it in court are not
so easily classified.
The connection that the court draws between medical and legal
malpractice suits on the one hand, and child sexual abuse claims on the
other hand, is furthermore conclusory. Medical malpractice claims have
statutory provisions allowing for a court-mandated expert panel,157
while sex abuse victims are not mandated the same luxury. The alleged
similarities between child molestation and legal malpractice also remain
to be clarified.
Finally, the court added in a footnote that given Maness’s failure to
offer expert testimony, the court would not decide whether even
properly supported allegations of repressed memory syndrome might
extend the statute of limitations.158 Thus, it is important to note that that
discovery rule may potentially be found not to apply to RMS victims,
even with proper expert testimony, if their abuses occurred prior to the
enactment of sections 09.10.065 and 09.10.140.
D.

Due Process

Maness argued on appeal that “requiring an indigent plaintiff to
‘hire an expert witness or suffer a summary judgment dismissal’”
violated due process under both the Alaska and United States
Constitutions.159 Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
155. E.g., id. at 526 n.15 (citing Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God,
534 S.E.2d 672, 680 (S.C. 2000), which holds that expert testimony is required to
prove at trial that plaintiff recovered a repressed memory.)
156. E.g., id. at 526 n.15 (citing Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul, 817 N.W.2d
150, 171 (Minn. 2012)).
157. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (2006).
158. Maness, 325 P.3d at 527 n.20.
159. Id. at 527 (citations omitted).
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shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.160
Similarly, Article I, section 7 of the Constitution of the State of
Alaska provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. The right of all persons to fair and
just treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations
shall not be infringed.”161
Access to the court system has been recognized as an important
right both federally and in Alaska,162 particularly for certain indigent
litigants.163 Alaska has furthermore recognized a right of access to the
judicial system beyond that recognized in United States Supreme Court
case law.164
Questions of substantive due process ask whether the
government’s deprivation of a person’s life, liberty, or property is
justified.165 The three elements of a substantive due process claim are as
follows: first, there must be a deprivation; second, it must be of life,
liberty, or property; and third, the government did not have an adequate
justification for its action.166 A justification is inadequate if it is not
sufficiently substantive.167
The court analyzed the claims for both state and federal law
simultaneously, by “comparing the private interest involved and the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest against the government’s

160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
161. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7.
162. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (“In short,
‘within the limits of practicability,’ a State must afford to all individuals a
meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due
Process Clause.”); Patrick v. Lynden Transport, Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska
1988) (“We have construed the right to court access under the Alaska
Constitution to be an important right.”).
163. See, e.g., Boddie, 401 U.S. at 385 (“[M]arriage and its dissolution are so
important that an unhappy couple who are indigent should have access to the
divorce courts free of charge.”); Varilek v. City of Houston, 104 P.3d 849, 855
(“‘[p]rohibitive’ filing fees should not be allowed to hamper an indigent
litigant’s access to the justice system . . . .”).
164. Varilek, 104 P.3d at 853–54 (“Alaska is not precluded from offering
greater rights and legal protections to its citizens than those offered by the
federal government. Accordingly, we have not limited the right to access
Alaskan courts without fees to indigents claiming “fundamental family
interests.” Rather, we have widened the right of access to the judicial system
beyond the Boddie line of cases.”).
165. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501
(1999).
166. Id. at 1527.
167. Id. at 1501.
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interest, including the fiscal and administrative burden of additional
procedural safeguards.”168 In doing so, the court described the private
interest involved in Maness’s case as “the right of access to the courts to
pursue a personal injury claim” and determined the right was
“important but not fundamental.”169 The compelling state interest, the
court found, was the purpose of the statute of limitations: to protect
defendants and the courts from having to prosecute cases where
necessary evidence is no longer available.170 In comparing these two
aspects of Maness’s claim, the court determined that—despite Alaska
Supreme Court case law finding that preventing an individual from civil
court access “rends the fabric of justice”171 and both Alaska and United
States Supreme Court case law holding that prohibitively high filing fees
violate due process172—requiring RMS plaintiffs to provide expert
testimony prior to jury access did not violate an individual’s due process
rights under either the United States or Alaska Constitutions.173 The
analysis did not include any consideration of alternative procedural
requirements to protect against stale claims or delve deeply into how
other state courts have handled the issue. The court instead stated that
requiring expert testimony at the pleadings stage of the case addressed a
legitimate concern and that paying for such testimony for indigent civil
litigants would be expensive.174
Further justification provided for the decision included federal
cases holding that there are situations in which a party may, consistent
with due process, be required to bear the reasonable expenses involved
in proving or defending a civil case.175 McNeil v. Lowney,176 a Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals case, concerned an inmate’s denied requests
for subpoenas requesting the testimony of his treating physicians in
light of his inability to pay witness fees.177 Failing to find an abuse of
discretion, the court noted that “the right of access to the courts does not
independently include a waiver of witness fees so that the indigent

168. Maness v. Gordon, 325 P.3d 522, 527 (Alaska 2014).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Alaska 1973).
172. See, e.g., Varilek v. City of Houston, 104 P.3d 849, 855 (Alaska 2004)
(holding that prohibitively high filing fees violate due process); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (forbidding states from erecting financial
barriers to an indigent person’s access to the divorce tribunals in the form of “a
prohibitive filing fee”).
173. Maness, 325 P.3d at 528.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 831 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1987).
177. Id. at 1373.
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litigant can present his case fully to the court.”178 Relatedly, in Johnson v.
Hubbard,179 the Sixth Circuit held as constitutional the denial of the
district court to pay the witness fees of a psychopath involuntarily
committed to a mental hospital.180 Along with these cases, the Alaska
Supreme Court found its decision in Maness consistent with previous
denials of providing state-paid medical experts to indigent medical
malpractice plaintiffs.181

III. ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SOLUTIONS
A few states have designed alternative solutions to dealing with the
concerns surrounding RMS. Though both California and Louisiana
allow application of the discovery rule to RMS cases, those states also
require the filing of a certificate of merit stating that the attorney of an
RMS case has conversed with a licensed mental health practitioner and
received advice.182 Failure to do so results in sanctions183 and, in
California, the possibility of paying a defendant’s attorneys’ fees.184
California courts will also not name a defendant in a RMS complaint
without corroborating evidence.185
Additional ideas include requiring that the RMS plaintiffs be
treated by a licensed therapist in order for the discovery doctrine to be
applied, and sealing RMS-related complaints given the chance of false
accusations.186 Other states have disallowed claims for childhood sexual
abuse against defendants who have died.187 Still other states have
enacted RMS statutes limiting the time an individual can file a claim to
after they have reached the age of majority.188 Distinctively, Colorado
limits the recoverable damages in childhood sex abuse claims brought
after the plaintiff turns thirty-three, in which case only psychological
expenses and attorneys’ fees will be permitted.189
Psychologists continue to suggest alternative legal approaches to
178. Id.
179. 698 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1983).
180. Id. at 289.
181. Maness v. Gordon, 325 P.3d 522, 528 (Alaska 2014).
182. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2800.9B (1993).
183. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2800.9B (1993).
184. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1.
185. § 340.1(j).
186. Sheila Taub, The Legal Treatment of Recovered Memories of Child Sexual
Abuse, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 183, 200 (1996).
187. Id. at 199.
188. Id.
189. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-103.7(3.5)(c) (West 1992).
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RMS claims as well. In Holdsworth’s article on the RMS controversy, she
discusses the proposition of a Truth and Responsibility in Mental Health
Practices Act, which would require therapists to obtain informed
consent of clients to all psychological treatment modalities before using
them.190 Failure to do so would result in license revocation.191
It is unclear in Maness192 whether the Alaska Supreme Court
considered these alternatives in crafting its opinion, but the option to
implement such changes remains available to the legislature. States
discontent with their current approach to RMS cases may also benefit
from considering these alternatives should the opportunity for change
arise.

CONCLUSION
Maness is a critical decision for any potential RMS plaintiff in
Alaska whose abuse occurred prior to 2001. These individuals will need
to finance expert testimony for the chance to see their day in court, at
which point Alaska courts may still be able to refuse to allow the
discovery rule to apply. It is unclear to what extent the expert testimony
must corroborate the plaintiff’s claims.
Maness also leads to additional, related questions. For example,
Alaska courts have yet to determine how to deal with defendants of
RMS cases who may want to sue plaintiffs’ therapists for malpractice.
The Alaska Supreme Court has generally approached duty of care issues
by first determining whether an actionable duty exists by statute or
existing precedent.193 If one does not exist, there is likely no duty for an
individual to protect another from a third party unless that person
“stands in a special relationship to either the dangerous person or the
potential victim, [and] the defendant is required to control the
dangerous person or warn or otherwise protect the victim.”194 The court
has additionally held that confidentiality statutes do not necessarily
nullify such a duty in the case of substance abuse treatment facility
employees.195 A case in Alaska has yet to occur where a third party sues
therapists for malpractice in light of implanted memories. It seems
unlikely, but should Alaska courts see an increase in RMS cases in the

190. Lynn Holdsworth, Is it Repressed Memory with Delayed Recall or is it False
Memory Syndrome? The Controversy and its Potential Implications, 22 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 103, 128 (1998).
191. Id.
192. Maness v. Gordon, 325 P.3d 522, 522 (Alaska 2014).
193. Bryson v. Banner Health Sys., 89 P.3d 800, 804 (Alaska 2004).
194. Id.
195. Id.
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future, the prevalence of therapist malpractice suits in the state may also
increase.
Fortunately for RMS plaintiffs who fall under section 09.10.065 or
section 09.10.140, paying for expert testimony for the sole purpose of
bringing a claim is not necessary. However, the extent to which Alaska
courts will allow experts to testify as to RMS diagnosis has yet to be
determined. Maness does not discuss any limitations of such expert
testimony, as the case did not go to trial. Alaska has adopted the Daubert
two-part test for expert testimony admissibility, but in light of the
controversy surrounding the acceptance of RMS in the scientific
community and the problems surrounding empirical tests, it is not clear
what a given court would decide, although Alaska’s Rules of Evidence
“contemplate a broad[] inquiry, allowing a proponent to establish
admissibility even if general acceptance is absent.”196
What is known is this: the Alaska Supreme Court has finally
responded to the national RMS controversy with unique, thoughtprovoking rule, the ramifications of which will be felt in the years to
come.

196. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 398 (Alaska 1999).

